"I am disinterested in making moral judgements."
Is there an implicit moral judgement in this statement? (It seems to me that there might be one... it seems to imply that passing moral judgements is morally reprehensible).
Suppose I were to say the following, to try and avoid making a moral judgement, and to simply explain why I do not want to make them:
"I am disinterested in making moral judgements because...
1) I don't know anything"I am disinterested in making moral judgements because...
2) It is a waste of time (because I don't know anything, because it generally changes nothing)
3) It can be damaging to others (those being judged) and to myself (the one judging)."Then would there still be an implicit moral judgment in saying this?
But then, does this reduce 'good' to merely a matter of utility? That just reminds me of what Nietzsche says about utilitarianism. (Specifically, his point that life isn't will to self-preservation, it's will to power -- and self-preservation is one aspect of that, but sometimes will to power contradicts self-preservation, like when warriors put their lives on the line for glory). Similarly, utility seems like a subset of good, but isn't good bigger than that? If so, and how, I have no idea. It seems like doing what is 'good' or 'right' sometimes might not correspond with what is 'useful' but is that just because our understanding of 'useful' is 'not as deep as it should be?
A day can really slip by when you're deliberately avoiding what you're supposed to do.
-Calvin (of Calvin and Hobbes, as written by Bill Watterson)
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